Investigating various corporate announcements and abnormal return days, I observe that around 2% of daily trading volume decreases only before scheduled earnings announcements. This empirical pattern is robust across different specifications and periods. Also, proxies of ex ante information asymmetry are consistently related to the trading volume only before scheduled earnings announcements. The timing information existing only in a scheduled announcement seems to have an important role in trading volume dynamics near an announcement. However, the market makers, observing order flows, behave appropriately even without timing information and increase the price sensitivities before all kinds of announcements. These results shed light on the role of a newly observed variable, timing information of an announcement, in investors' trading decision under information asymmetry in the stock market. 
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Investigating various corporate announcements and abnormal return days, I observe that around 2% of daily trading volume decreases only before scheduled earnings announcements. This empirical pattern is robust across different specifications and periods. Also, proxies of ex ante information asymmetry are consistently related to the trading volume only before scheduled earnings announcements. The timing information existing only in a scheduled announcement seems to have an important role in trading volume dynamics near an announcement. However, the market makers, observing order flows, behave appropriately even without timing information and increase the price sensitivities before all kinds of announcements. These results shed light on the role of a newly observed variable, timing information of an announcement, in investors' trading decision under information asymmetry in the stock market.
Introduction
Since trading volume, in addition to price, is a fundamental factor constituting a market and is closely related to liquidity, the driving force to generate or degenerate trading volume has been an interesting research topic in financial economics. 1 As shown in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) or Black (1986) , information asymmetry can drive trading volume down. In a hypothetical extreme case, namely the "No Trade Theorem", there will be no trading and only price change in a market. However, in various studies about corporate announcements, e.g., takeover announcements, bond rating changes, etc., even though there is presumably enormous information asymmetry before these announcements, none of these studies observe decreasing trading volume. 2 This paper will demonstrate that decreasing trading volume exists before earnings announcements and that information asymmetry causes this decrease.
Also, I argue that timing information, existing only before a scheduled announcement, has an important role in the relation between trading volume and information asymmetry.
When there is an information issuance in the future, informed investors can have two types of informational advantage over uninformed investors. One advantage is provided by information about future cash flows and the other is by timing information of this corporate event. For example, the CEO of IBM knows a target company that IBM will acquire and knows the timing of this announcement. In this case, no one except for informed investors can infer these two kinds of information. However, there is another type of an announcement, such as an earnings announcement, whose timing can be anticipated by everyone in the market. Even though uninformed investors do not know the magnitude of the information to be announced, they know there will be an important piece of information on a specific day, and this knowledge is common to everyone in the market. For example, liquidity traders, lacking only the information about cash flow, can optimize their trading with the timing information, as in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , or Foster and 1 See Karpoff (1987) or Lo and Wang (2000) 2 See Jarrell and Poulsen (1989b) , Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) etc. Viswanathan (1990) . If more informed investors in the market are expected, discretionary uninformed investors will not participate in trading because of the adverse selection cost.
On the other hand, in the case of an unscheduled announcement, the market participants except for informed traders cannot determine when a piece of cash flow information will be issued. Therefore, if uninformed traders do not infer the information issuance from the current information set, they cannot adjust their behavior prior to the announcement in the same way as they do with timing information, and informed traders will be able to take advantage of this timing information. Therefore, the dynamics of trading volume before a scheduled announcement and that before an unscheduled announcement should be different.
To compare trading volume among different announcements, this paper analyzes earnings announcements and takeover announcements. These two particular data sets are selected because these two major corporate events have been widely researched and their impact on return and trading volume has been shown to be substantial. 3 Also, I use a simulation with non-earnings, non-takeover announcements days with large price changes to provide a more general example of trading volume before large price movements.
Many financial economists and accounting researchers have developed theoretical models and performed empirical research concerning trading volume. Bamber (1987) tries to link the size of trading volume on an earnings announcement day with the significance of the news. Atiase and Bamber (1994) follow the hypothesis of Bamber (1987) and empirically establish that there is a positive relation between the trading volume on an earnings announcement day and information asymmetry measured by the analyst coverage. However, they do not consider how uninformed investors' strategic behavior is related to the trading volume process before an announcement as I do in this paper. Although Kim and Verrecchia (1994) analyze the effect on trading volume from an earnings announcement, they concentrate mostly on ex post information asymmetry that, according to their hypothesis, 3 See Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) , Jensen and Ruback (1983) , and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989a) results from investors' different abilities in interpreting the announced information. On the other hand, this paper will introduce a typical trading volume pattern caused by ex ante information asymmetry.
Until now, in my knowledge, none of research shows the decreased trading volume before any announcement. 4 However, does exist much literature about the increasing trading volume before a corporate event, such as Jarrell and Poulsen (1989b) . This paper considers "timing information asymmetry" related to the difference of trading volume pattern between scheduled earnings announcements and other unscheduled announcements.
As theoretical papers discussing time series variation of trading volume, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) deserve mention. Both papers theoretically explain the empirical observation of a U-shaped intraday trading volume through the argument that discretionary liquidity traders and informed traders will concentrate their trading in the period when the price sensitivity from the order flow is the least. Their explanations are consistent with the empirical observations in this paper, but they did not analyze the role of timing information that I propose. Wang (1994) shows that the correlation between absolute price change and trading volume is higher as information asymmetry is higher. He also mentions that high information asymmetry causes an adverse selection problem of uninformed investors and less trading volume in the market. According to his argument, if information asymmetry is so severe that price change cannot induce other traders on the opposite side, there will be less trading volume before an announcement even though there is a high correlation between price change and trading volume on the announcement.
In this paper, I not only describe a pattern of decreasing trading volume prior to an announcement, but also relate this pattern with ex ante information asymmetry as argued in Wang (1994) . Since the size, number of analysts, and industry characteristics of a company are considered to be measures of ex ante information asymmetry before earnings announcements, 5 I use these variables to show the effect of information asymmetry on trading volume prior to an announcement. If the size of a company is smaller; if fewer analysts cover a company; or if a company is in an industry in which informed investors have more advantage over uninformed traders before an earnings announcement; then trading volume before a scheduled announcement should be smaller.
Since the market makers who set prices are also considered to be uninformed parties, an analysis of the price sensitivity to the order flow before information issuances would enrich our understanding about the role of timing information and trading volume dynamics in the market. Interestingly, the price sensitivities before every announcement are increased, even though trading volume decreases only before a scheduled earnings announcement. A conjecture about the reason will be mentioned in the following sections. This paper shows that uninformed investors are reluctant to trade because of the adverse selection cost before an information release only if they know the timing of it. These results empirically confirm the "no trade theorem," but suggest that the timing of an announcement is a factor important to the theorem. In addition to the empirical observation that trading volume decreases only before earnings announcements, the statistically significant relation, only before scheduled earnings announcements, between trading volume and the proxies of information asymmetry specifies the key role of timing information in the dynamics of trading volume with information asymmetry.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I list 4 hypotheses about trading volume that will be tested in the following sections. In Section 3, as a test of Hypothesis 1, I describe the trading volume pattern before different types of announcements and investigate the robustness of this empirical observation. Section 4 contains empirical 5 For example, see Hong et al.(1998) or Atiase and Bamber (1994) .
tests about the other hypotheses in Section 2. Section 5 provides other implications from the results and finally, in Section 6, I offer concluding remarks.
Hypotheses
Based on various event studies about corporate announcements, e.g., earnings or takeover announcements, it is asserted that a considerable amount of information is publicized in these announcements. Therefore, immediately before these announcements, there should be the most severe information asymmetry between the informed and the uninformed investors. As shown in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) , Black (1986), and Wang (1994) , if there is a high possibility to trade with a more informed counter party, i.e., there exists severe adverse selection cost, then traders will not participate in trading. In an extreme case in which only one informed investor and one uninformed investor exist, the informed investor with positive cash flow information wants to buy the stock before an announcement, but it is almost impossible for her to buy it since the uninformed investors will not sell the stock without any urgent need for liquidity. Therefore, it is reasonably hypothesized that trading volume decreases before any announcement. However, there is a necessary condition for this hypothesis to work. The uninformed should know or at least correctly infer the timing of the impending information issuance. Because uninformed investors' deviation from the market depends upon the expected adverse selection cost, to justify decreasing trading volume before an announcement, there should be a reasonably high level of informed trading that uninformed investors perceive. 6 If we assume that informed trading and uninformed liquidity trading are always mixed in the market, uninformed traders have difficulty in determining whether the trading is resulting from information or from liquidity. On the other hand, if there is a scheduled announcement such as an earnings announcement, uninformed investors easily conjecture the high probability of informed trading before the 6 As an effort to estimate the probability of informed trading, see Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (1999). announcement since the schedule is knowledge common to everyone in the market. Based on these arguments, trading volume before a scheduled announcement should decrease, and the level of trading volume before an unscheduled announcement will depend on uninformed investors' inference about the existence of information asymmetry.
Hypothesis 1 Before an information announcement, trading volume should decrease if uninformed investors expect the announcement.
Since the degree of uninformed investors' incentive to deviate from the market depends on ex ante information asymmetry, the trading volume before a scheduled announcement should be negatively correlated with the level of ex ante information asymmetry.
Hypothesis 2 The trading volume before a scheduled announcement is negatively correlated with the level of ex ante information asymmetry.
As argued by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) or Foster and Viswanathan (1990) , discretionary uninformed investors, when they need to trade for liquidity, try to select a period when the price sensitivity to the order flow is the lowest. This implies that when there is a scheduled information issuance and uninformed investors deviate from the market, the price sensitivity from the order flow should be higher.
Hypothesis 3 There will be higher price sensitivity to the order flow before a scheduled announcement.
Given various empirical results about the increasing volatility around earnings announcements (e.g., Donders and Vorst (1996) ), changing risk can be another driving force of trading volume before corporate announcements. In a hypothetical world in which there is no information asymmetry, investors will trade securities with allocation and/or liquidity motives.
If investors with only allocational motives know that there will be change of risk in the future, they will have an incentive to trade according to their risk preference. For example, if a utility company acquires a high risk bio-tech company, this increasing risk feature can induce the demand from risk lovers and the supply from risk averters. Therefore, trading volume before a known risk-changing announcement can increase. However, if information asymmetry exists in this market, the trading volume from risk sharing incentive might not be as important as it is without information asymmetry. Because only informed investors know the change of cash flow in the future and have more advantage when the amount of changing risk (in this case, the change of price on the announcement day) is larger, the dynamics of trading volume will be different than the case without information asymmetry.
Uninformed investors, who do not know the level of changing risk but know the timing of the forthcoming announcements, will be more concerned about the possibility of being taken advantage by informed investors. 
Tests
This section contains an empirical test of Hypothesis 1: Before an information announcement, trading volume should decrease if uninformed investors expect this announcement.
Data and description of variables
In this research, I use three announcements as corporate event data: earnings announcements, acquisition announcements, and target announcements. The effect on the return and trading volume near an earnings announcement is well documented in many previous studies, such as Bamber (1987) , Bamber and Cheon (1995) , and Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) . Among corporate announcements, those having as much effect on the return and trading volume as earnings announcements are takeover announcements that can be divided into acquisition announcements and target announcements. Therefore in this paper I select acquisition and target announcements as typical unscheduled information issuances. Even though these major corporate announcements are investigated, these announcements cannot represent every aspect of corporate news. Also, unknown characteristics of these three announcements might affect the results. Therefore, I randomly select a fixed number of observations out of a sample that includes large price change days. 7 The analysis of these random observations of large price changes will complement the problem inherent in using three different kinds of announcements in the analysis. To control firm-specific characteristics and increase the power of my tests, I match the companies' earnings data and takeover data in the robustness check section. After I match the companies in the earnings announcement sample with those in the acquisition announcement sample, there are 55,747 earnings announcements and 19,888 acquisition an-7 The exact procedure for this data will be stated in the following section.
nouncements. For companies included both in earnings announcement data and in target announcement data, there are 51,130 earnings announcements and 8,430 target announcements. The number of observations after each filter is given in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 here
Since there are various measures of trading volume, one measure needs to be chosen.
Because trading volume can be affected by the number of outstanding shares, I use turnover defined as in Equation 1. 8 Turnover distribution has a very fat tail and an extreme positive skewness as shown in Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 here Compared with cross-sectional average of skewness and kurtosis of return, 1.049 and 23.407 in 1986 to 2000, those of turnover are 8.596 and 159.439 respectively in the same period. Therefore, a log turnover will be more appropriate in analysis. Once a logarithm is applied, the skewness and the kurtosis decrease to -0.098 and 0.701. 9
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The difference between each log turnover in a test period and the benchmark log turnover calculated in an estimation period will measure the abnormality of trading volume near each announcement as in Equation 2.
where,
To define abnormal trading volume and look for it in an announcement window, I need at least 51 trading-day observations. Therefore, in all samples, only companies with 51 days of non-missing turnover are included in the final data set.
Empirical results
Using the variables in the previous section, I obtain the cross-sectional average of abnormal turnover (ξ i,t ) from t=-10 to 10. The level of abnormal turnover in the period t-10 to t-3 is statistically significant, with less than 1% p-value, as shown in Table 3 . I find a decrease of around 1 to 3% of daily trading volume, on average, prior to an earnings announcement.
For a summary measure, I construct the average of abnormal turnover (
t=−10 ξ i,t /8) in the period t-10 to t-3 and observe that the negative turnover is large enough with t-statistics of -8.96. 10 This implies that low turnover in a day is significant, but more importantly, a continuous streak of low turnover in this period is extraordinary.
Insert Table 3 here I compare the result from earnings announcements with the results from two major corporate announcements: an announcement that a firm is acquiring a company and one that a firm is being targeted as an acquiree by a company. 11 This comparison will assure that the timing information is critical in trading volume dynamics before an announcement.
Obviously, the time series patterns of these announcements are different from those of earnings announcements. There is no negative abnormal trading volume prior to either type of announcement. Before these announcements, we can even observe statistically significant positive abnormal trading volume. 12 Compared with acquisition or target announcements before which the trading volume increases, the significance of the decreased trading volume before an earnings announcement is conspicuous.
Insert Figure 1 here
To summarize information, I provide a plot of cumulative abnormal percentage turnover in the period from t=-15 to t=15. In Fig. 1 (a), for around 12 consecutive days, the turnover before an earnings announcement decreases more than 15% cumulatively. However, in Fig. 1(b) and 1(c) for acquisition and target announcements, we cannot observe any pattern of decrease in the turnover for this period. Moreover, the turnover has increased considerably.
To confirm that the measure of the abnormal turnover is appropriate, I chose random days and companies from the earnings announcement data set, and did the same procedure as in the above investigation about three kinds of announcements. I carefully select the day so that the estimation and the event window do not include any of three announcements dates.
In this case, only stable patterns of abnormal trading volume near zero can be observed, as shown in Fig. 1(d) . Therefore, the unbiased nature of the measure of abnormal turnover is confirmed.
To supplement the results from three different announcements (earnings, acquisition, and target announcements) that might not represent all corporate events, I implement a simulation analysis with the whole data set. Through this simulation, I can show which pattern of trading volume is observed before a large price change. Since a large price change must be observed whenever meaningful news is announced, the consistent simulation result will reinforce the striking nature of the observed decreasing trading volume prior to an earnings announcement.
First, from each of 5 strata formed according to the size of companies in the NYSE and the AMEX (i.e., bottom 20%, the next 20%, etc.), 10,000 observations between 1986 and 2000 are randomly selected according to a given minimum level of absolute return. For example, in the data in which absolute return is larger than 1% and market capitalization is in the bottom 20%, I select a random sample of 10,000, and do the same procedure in the other 4 size groups. The total number of observations from all 5 strata is 50,000. The reason to use this size-stratified sampling is that it would be a biased sample (biased to include more small and volatile companies) if the sample is randomly chosen only according to a fixed minimum of absolute return. 13 The size stratified sampling ensures that the sampling is not biased. With the 1% minimum absolute return filter, the average of absolute return from the random sample is 2.82% on t=0. Any earnings, acquisition, and target announcements are excluded around those randomly selected days (i.e., in t=-40 to t=+10) before the random selection procedure. Second, with the same procedure used to produce Table 3, I obtain the abnormal trading volume measure, the average of abnormal turnover from t=-10 to t=-3.
Insert Figure 2 here
As shown in Fig. 2 , none of the average abnormal trading volumes in t=-10 to -3 across different values of absolute return on t=0 have statistically significant negative values. The absolute return used to draw each bar is from 0.2%, 0.4%, 0.6%, 0.8%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 3.0%, 4.0%, 5.0%, 7.0%, and 10.0% for 11 bars in Fig. 2 . Especially, around 2.66%, the mean of absolute returns on earnings announcement days, 14 only positive abnormal trading volume is observed. For example, with the average absolute return on t=0 of 2.64%, the abnormal turnover between t=-10 and t=-3 is around 0.50% with t-statistic of 2.20. Therefore, these simulation results show that only large trading volume is observed before every large 13 Actually, if you select a sample without strata, the percentages of companies from 5 different size group would be 43.03%, 19.33%, 14.69%, 12.54%, and 10.41% from the smallest to largest, even though in the earnings announcement sample, the percentages are 18.34%, 20.51%, 20.57%, 20.12%, and 20.46%.
14 The average of absolute return on acquisition announcement days is 2.43% and that on target announcement days 5.53%.
price change other than earnings announcements. This provides strong evidence that the decreased trading volume before an earnings announcement is unique and that the timing information before an earnings announcement has an important role in trading volume dynamics.
Robustness check
The first robustness check uses different lengths of estimation windows. For the normal level of turnover, the estimation window in this paper is the period from t=-40 to t=-11. To check robustness, I attach a summarized table in Panel A of Table 4 from a longer estimation window from t=-55 to t=-11. 15 In this table, the result is further strengthened, with a -2.251% decrease from the normal level of turnover. With various lengths of estimation windows that I do not report, the results are robust enough.
Another robustness check involves the use of raw turnover. In Panel B of Table 4, I apply another approach to an event study in which the median abnormal measure and a bootstrapped distribution for inference are used. Using the median value of raw turnovers between t=-40 and t=-11 as a benchmark, the percentage value of abnormal turnover in a testing period of t=-10 to t=+10 is constructed. In the table, I report the cross-sectional median of the percentage abnormal turnover in a summarized format. For the inference, I used a non-parametric bootstrapped distribution. 16 With this method, the statistically significant decreased trading volume is observed only before an earnings announcement.
Insert Table 4 here
In an event study, abnormality of a variable, e.g., return or volume, is usually measured in two ways. The first one is using the fixed mean from an estimation period and the other is using a one-factor market model. To investigate the robustness across the methods to define abnormality, I use an one-factor market model in Panel C of Table 4 . From the estimation period, the coefficient of log value-weighted turnover index is estimated and applied to obtain abnormal turnover in the testing period. The reported values are the difference between the realized log turnover and the estimated normal level of log turnover. As in other robustness checks, only before an earnings announcement, is a statistically significant -4.186% decreasing trading volume observed.
To check the stability of this specific pattern, I provide the subperiod results in Panel D of Table 4 . Among the three subperiods, only in the earliest period of 1986-2000, is the significance level 5%. In the other two subperiods, the abnormal log turnover decreases to around 2-3% with less than 1% significance level. Before either an acquisition or a target announcement, I do not observe this particular trading volume pattern.
Since I compare different announcement databases, there might be different unobserved characteristics of companies in each announcement sample. To control for any firm-specific characteristics, I select the same companies in the earnings announcement sample and in the acquisition or the target announcement sample. For example, in the earnings announcement and acquisition announcement matching sample, every company exists in both the earnings announcement data and the acquisition announcement data. The result from the matching sample shows a stronger pattern of decreasing trading volume only before an earnings announcement, as in Panel E of Table 4 . Before matching, the average of the abnormal turnover from t=-10 to t=-3 is -1.882%. It slightly decreases to -1.915% and -1.887% when the data are matched with the acquisition announcement sample and the target announcement sample, respectively.
Through the previous series of robustness checks, it is concluded that the decreasing trading volume pattern prior to a scheduled earnings announcement is substantial and robust.
Further empirical analysis
In this section, Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 will be tested. First, Hypothesis 2 will provide the cross-sectional relation between trading volume and information asymmetry. Second, the test of Hypothesis 3 will report the analysis of price sensitivity to the order flow related to an information issuance and its timing information. Finally, by testing Hypothesis 4, I
will demonstrate the interaction among trading volume, information asymmetry, and risk around an information release.
Information asymmetry and trading volume
Since we cannot directly measure the information asymmetry in the market, I investigate the relation between the trading volume and several proxy variables for the information asymmetry, such as size, analyst coverage, and industry group.
Since the size of a company has been used as a proxy of information asymmetry in many studies (e.g., Hong, Lim and Stein (1998) ), investigation of the relation between the size of a company and the trading volume prior to each announcement is essential. In Table 5, I report the results from regression analyses using a size variable, log capitalization. First, the results from pooled regressions are shown, and then the results from Fama/MacBeth (1973) type regression are stated. As expected, only before an earnings announcement can I notice the expected relation between size and trading volume before an announcement. The coefficients of log capitalization across different specifications are statistically significantly positive. If we assume that a smaller company has more information asymmetry than a larger company, information asymmetry surely affects the trading behavior before an earnings announcement. Even though there is a larger or similar price change before an acquisition or a target announcement, the size variable does not seem to relate to the trading volume before those announcements.
Insert Table 5 here
As shown in Table 5 , the trading volume of a company's stock before an earnings announcement is positively related with the number of analysts covering the company. 17
This relation between the trading volume and the number of analysts is consistent with the hypothesis that there should be more trading accomplished when there is less information asymmetry before a scheduled announcement because the liquidity traders will stay in the market. Since analysts post their forecasts in various media, individual investors can obtain this information easily. If investors cannot find information with a relatively small cost, they will consider themselves uninformed and will not participate in the market. On the other hand, there is almost no relation between the number of analysts and the trading volume before an acquisition announcement or a target announcement.
According to the nature of a company's business, the earnings announcements from one company cannot give as much new information as those from another company. For example, before an earnings announcement from a clothing company, compared to one from a petroleum company, uninformed traders do not have the same amount of information.
The performance of the oil industry is heavily dependent on the market price of oil. This price is readily available. The uninformed traders do not need to react to this oil company's earnings announcement as much as to that of another company whose performance they cannot easily estimate. I analyze this effect on the trading volume due to industry characteristics using dummy variables in Table 5 . Prior to the earnings announcement from a raw material industry, such as petroleum, logging or mining industry, uninformed traders do not worry about the informed traders' informational advantage and stay in the market before a scheduled earnings announcement. As with other announcements, no statistically significant values of these coefficients are observed.
As shown in many previous studies (e.g., Wang (1994) ), trading volume has high corre-17 The number of analysts is provided in the I/B/E/S summary file. lation with contemporaneous price change. One of non-information asymmetry frameworks is the liquidity based hypothesis. Even without any information asymmetry, the relation between supply and demand will cause price changes accompanying the changes of order flow.
Therefore, trading volume and price change should be correlated. To control the liquidity based trading and/or to accommodate the most important variable in contemporaneous trading volume, I include the price change in this period (t=-10 to -3). "Prior Absolute
Return" in Table 5 implies the absolute value of average daily return from t=-10 to t=-3.
As expected, the size of the estimated coefficient and its t-statistic is enormous. However, even after including this critical control variable, the effect from proxies of information asymmetry to the trading volume is not changed.
To control the time series relation between the dependent variable and the independent variables, along with taking care of company-by-company clustered data, the results from Table 5 , with the randomly selected 50,000 high price change days used to draw the fourth bar in Fig. 2 (the most similar price change average to that on earnings announcement days, 2.64% vs. 2.66%), the same investigation as in Panel A, B, and C is applied. Overall, we find that the relation between regressors and the trading volume is much smaller and less significant than one from earnings announcements. Since the randomly selected data can include other scheduled announcements different from earnings announcements (e.g., court orders), the similarity between the result from earnings announcements and the result from random data set is understandable. However, in Panel B or C, with clearly controlled unscheduled announcements, none of the information asymmetry proxies have significant t-statistics.
On the basis of the previous evidence, it is asserted that information asymmetry has an important role in the trading volume but it is difficult for investors to react without timing information, as with acquisition or target announcements. (Hypothesis 2) 
Price sensitivity
If larger informed trading is expected, the market maker will increase price sensitivity to the order flow to protect herself. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the price sensitivity near an announcement or an abnormally large price change day. This investigation will show how the market maker behaves before different types of announcements. As discussed in the previous sections, traders in the market behave differently according to the scheduling of an announcement. Since the market maker has better information (e.g., at least she knows the order flow) than uninformed investors, the analysis of her behavior will show how one of the comparatively better informed participants in the market reacts to another type of information asymmetry; timing information asymmetry.
To implement the analysis about the price sensitivity to the order flow, the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database is used. From the initial earnings, acquiring, and target announcements and high price change days (average absolute return on t=0 is about the same as that of earnings announcement days, i.e., 2.64%), 1,100 observations are randomly selected.
Then, after matching with the TAQ database, 1,068, 1,025, 961, and 719 observations are analyzed. Table 6 compares the price sensitivity to the order flow among announcements.
Obtaining price sensitivities from estimation period and testing period, I construct a measure of difference between these price sensitivities from the two periods. The price sensitivity is measured by regressing return on signed order flow. To add the sign of each order flow, the technique in Lee and Ready (1991) is used in this research. Since the possible increase in number of trades before an information issuance is also related to ex ante information asymmetry and informed/uninformed investors' trading in the market, as in Kyle (1985) , the companies in the data set are grouped with respect to the number of trades in the testing period.
Insert Table 6 here As in Table 6 , the market maker raises price sensitivity before all three types of announcements and randomly selected large price change days. Without any restriction in the number of trades in the testing period, the differences between the price sensitivity in the testing period and that in the estimation period are 0.255, 0.211, 0.425, and 0.623 from earnings announcements, acquisition announcements, target announcements, and large price change days, respectively. All of these differences are statistically significant. Therefore, the price sensitivities are increased before an announcement no matter whether it is scheduled or not.
First, as hypothesized, before earnings announcements, the market maker sets higher price sensitivity. This phenomenon is easily explained by the argument that there will be less trading and higher price sensitivity because of high adverse selection and accordingly high transaction cost.
However, interestingly, the higher price sensitivity is also observed before unscheduled announcements and random large price change days other than earnings and takeover announcements. As the reason for this, I conjecture the following explanation. The price sensitivity is set by the market makers having more information about demand and supply of securities through the order book. If the market makers can extract timing information or at least some confidence about larger trading driven by information, they can optimize their behavior (increasing price sensitivity) better than uninformed investors even before an unscheduled announcement.
Based upon the results in this section, a market maker generally behaves in an appropriate way to protect herself. She can find an abnormal movement in order flow near announcements or large price change days even without any specific timing information and raise the price sensitivity. Therefore, we can conclude that the decreased trading volume before an earnings announcement is consistent with the market maker's price setting behavior. However, in the case of an acquisition or a target announcement, the uninformed investors cannot adjust their trading even though the market maker can do so. The uninformed traders, who cannot observe second-by-second order flows in the market as the market makers do, consider the possibility of adverse selection cost seriously only when they have timing information.
Relation with risk around an announcement day
Like Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) , many studies provide evidence on higher risk during an announcement day. In a world of no information asymmetry, in which investors trade by risk sharing motives or endowment shocks, expected change of risk will induce higher trading because investors will change their portfolios with respect to their risk preferences.
For example, if a very safe stock is changed into a high risk stock tomorrow, high-riskbearing investors will acquire this stock more and low-risk-bearing investors will remove this stock. Therefore, a corporate announcement, presumably triggering change of risk in the stock price, will generate higher trading volume if there is no information asymmetry.
However, once information asymmetry is involved, the relation between change of risk and trading volume is not so simple. Because informed investors prefer the situation in which their information is not accommodated in the price until they can accumulate or remove their position, 18 larger price or risk change with information asymmetry is always beneficial to informed traders. Once potential change of risk is expected by everyone in an informationally asymmetric stock market, the economy should bear the adverse selection cost, and as a result the trading will decrease.
To test the above argument, a feasible and appropriate risk measure must be chosen.
Since none of the known risk measures perfectly capture all risk that a stock bears, in this paper, I use several measures for robustness. The first is the price change on the announcement day. Even though this is an ideal measure for risk change caused by the announcement, this measure can incur an endogeneity problem when we deal with trading volume before an announcement, as in this paper. For example, there might be effects not only from risk (price change at t=0) on turnover before t=0, but also from turnover before t=0 on risk at t=0. Therefore, to accommodate this endogeneity problem, the price change from the previous announcement is investigated. In an earnings announcement case, this measure can be a good proxy for the price change on the current earnings announcement because of small variations between the performance of adjacent quarters. 19 Finally, I investigate the change in beta between a pre-announcement period and a post-announcement period. The change in beta is measured by the percentage change from beta in the pre-announcement period (i.e., t=-1 to -70) to beta in the post-announcement period (i.e.,t=+1 to +70). Table 7 reports the results from the analysis with these three variables.
Insert Table 7 here First, the estimated coefficients of the proxies of information asymmetry rarely change in their sizes and degrees of significance. Therefore, even after considering a risk measure, the relation between the trading volume prior to an earnings announcement and information asymmetry is sustained. Second, like the relation between trading volume and information asymmetry, the relation between trading volume and risk measures is the most noticeable before an earnings announcement. Third, among risk measures, the percentage change in beta (Chgbeta) has no significance.
In Table 7 , as hypothesized in Hypothesis 4, increasing risk degenerates trading volume prior to an announcement because increasing uncertainty provides informed investors with more advantage when they trade with uninformed investors. Essentially, the results in Table 7 correspond to those of Table 5 . The relation between trading volume and proxies of information asymmetry is the most conspicuous in scheduled earnings announcement data. It is consistent with the empirical observation of decreasing trading volume before a scheduled announcement that the relation between trading volume and risk measures is insignificant if investors have no timing information. Apparently, the timing information seems to take a key role in the fluctuation in trading volume.
Other implications
Until now, on the basis of the tests about the hypotheses, this paper shows that timing information about an announcement lets uninformed investors evaluate the severity of adverse selection cost in the stock market and optimize their trading. On the other hand, if there is no timing information, uninformed investors seem to have no consideration of the potential adverse selection cost. Therefore, another interesting interpretation of these results would be concerning the overconfidence of uninformed investors. As shown in takeover (especially, target) announcements, uninformed investors keep participating in the market when they observe abnormally high trading volume. Apparently, they know that some informed traders exist in the market and that they might trade with these informationally superior traders, but uninformed or less informed investors do not worry about the possible adverse selection cost and jump into flurries of trading. This phenomenon can be understood as typical overconfidence of investors, as behavioral finance argues.
Another point we should reflect upon is the behavior of the market makers. The market makers are also uninformed about the timing of an announcement. However, they consistently react to the "hidden" timing information even before unscheduled takeover announcements. I reason that the privilege of market makers to observe the order book can help them recognize an impending information issuance and protect themselves by increasing the price sensitivity to the order flow. The results in this paper contribute to understanding the importance of information disclosure in the stocks market or of security market design related to optimal transparency level in the security market.
Conclusion
Using the I/B/E/S earnings announcement, the SDC takeover announcement data, and randomly selected abnormal price change data, I report that the decreasing trading volume exists only before an earnings announcement. On average, 2% of trading volume per day decreases in the period from 10 days to 3 days before an earnings announcement.
Around takeover and target announcement days, only abnormally high trading volume can be observed. In a simulation, I investigate the trading volume before a day when there is abnormally large price change without any earnings, acquisition, or target announcements.
Even in this experiment, the decreasing trading volume pattern is never noticed.
The robustness of this research methodology has been carefully probed. Even when using different estimation windows, median abnormal raw turnover, varying subperiods, and the companies included in all of the three different announcement data sets, the main result of this paper is sustained. This specific pattern seems to be even more pronounced in recent subperiods, unlike most anomalies in financial economics. This interesting pattern of trading volume reveals the relation between trading volume and information asymmetry. The information asymmetry differently affects trading behavior of uninformed investors with or without timing information. Also, I relate the trading volume pattern to proxies of the ex ante information asymmetry. The proxies, analyst coverage, size, and industry categorization, are all correspondingly related with the trading volume only before a scheduled earnings announcement.
Since the market maker is also dealing with informed traders, if she faces higher adverse selection cost, she will raise price sensitivity to protect herself. The results from the analyses of the price sensitivity and the trading volume are consistent with the hypotheses in the previous section. Moreover, interestingly, the market maker increases price sensitivity, not only before a scheduled earnings announcement, but also before acquisition, target, and even random large price change days. The reason for this phenomenon may be due to the order book information the market makers hold. The complete analysis of the behavior of market makers with or without timing information is beyond the scope of this research. In each announcement, differences between log turnover in t=-15 to +15 and average log turnover in t=-45 to -16 are calculated. Then, cumulative sum of the differences from t=-15 to +15 are drawn. The turnover is a number of trading volume divided by shares outstanding. For Plot (d), using a randomly selected data set, the same procedures as in other plots are implemented. For more explanation about the exact procedure, see Section 3. 
5.34
From 1986 to 2000, for each 20% size percentile NYSE and AMEX companies, 10,000 random company announcements with the filter of a minimum absolute return on t=0 are selected to make a size balanced 50,000 high price change sample. Therefore, for the first bar of this graph, with the minimum absolute return of 0.2% on t=0, "2.10" means that the average of absolute return on t=0 from randomly selected 50,000 observations is 2.10%. The minimum absolute returns for each bar are 0.2%, 0.4%, 0.6%, 0.8%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 3.0%, 4.0%, 5.0%, 7.0%, and 10.0% from the left to the right. From t=-40 to t=+10 around these days, no earnings, acquisition, or target announcements exist in 50,000 random observations. The abnormal turnover is the average of the differences between log turnover from t=-10 to t=-3 and average log turnover estimated from t=-40 to t=-11. The turnover is trading volume divided by shares outstanding. The estimated t-statistics for the average abnormal turnover in t=-10 to -3 are given above each bar. Table 1 : Data sets and applied filter "# of Obs. Filter" means that at least 40 trading days before an announcement and 10 days after the announcement are required to be in an analyzed data set. Through "Matching", only companies existing in both announcements are included in each sample. Therefore, for example, "After Matching with Target" means that the companies in this data set should have at least one earnings announcement and one target announcement. The abnormal turnover around each announcement from the companies in the NYSE and the AMEX between 1986 and 2000 is the percentage of the difference between log turnover and average log turnover estimated from t=-40 to t=-11. The turnover is a number of trading volume divided by shares outstanding. The t-statistics are given in parentheses. Average (-10,-3) is the average of abnormal turnover from t=-10 to t=-3. Difference of averages implies the difference of the average values of abnormal turnover from t=-10 to t=-3, and t-values are estimated from the assumption that the abnormal turnover in each announcement has a different variance. For the abnormal trading volume, except for panel B in which the difference between raw turnover and median turnover from t=-40 to t=-11 is used and panel C in which the residual from one factor market model (regressing log percentage turnover on log percentage value weighted market turnover in NYSE and AMEX) is used as the abnormal trading volume, the average of log turnover in the estimation period (45 days in panel A and 30 days in panel C, D, and E) is calculated and subtracted from the log turnover in the event window. The turnover is a number of trading volume divided by shares outstanding. In panel A, C, D, and E, , †, and ‡ mean respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% in the left tail of t-distribution and •, * , and mean respectively 10%, 5%, and 1% in the right tail of the t-distribution. In panel B, , †, ‡, •, * , and are from the bootstrapped distribution. This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in abnormal trading volume to proxies of ex ante information asymmetry. Except for the last row of each panel, the result from a Fama/MacBeth (1973) type regression, the results are from pooled regressions. The dependent variable is defined as the difference between average log turnover from t=-10 to t=-3 and average log turnover from t=-11 to t=-40. Among independent variables, "Prior Absolute Return" means the absolute value of average return in the period from t=-10 to t=-3. All the coefficients have been multiplied by a factor of 100, and t-statistics are given in parentheses. The price sensitivity (λ) is estimated from the corresponding period, t=-40 to -11 or t=-10 to -3 in random samples from the initial earnings, acquisition, and target announcements data sets. The number of observations in the initial earnings announcements is 65,912, that in the acquisition announcements 25,087, and that in the target announcements 12,485. From 1,100 randomly selected observations in each announcement data set, through matching with the Trade and Quote (TAQ) data set and the applied number of observation filters, the final data set for earnings announcements, acquisition announcements and target announcements has 1,068, 1,025 and 961 observations, respectively. For panel D, randomly selected 719 observations from the data set used in Panel D of Table 5 are analyzed. To estimate the price sensitivity, I regress return in basis point on signed order flow (turnover in basis point signed by the technique in Lee and Ready (1991) ).
NYSE and AMEX Earnings
Average number of trading per day in (-10,-3) ≤ 10 ≤ 100 > 100 Total This table reports the results of regressions to examine the variation in the increase in abnormal trading volume to a risk measure, the price change on an announcement day. The dependent variable is defined as the difference between average log turnover from t=-10 to t=-3 and average log turnover from t=-11 to t=-40. Among independent variables, "Absret0" means the absolute return on a current announcement day, "Labsret0" the absolute return on the last announcement day, "Chgbeta" the percentage change from the estimated beta in t=-70 to -1 and one in t=+1 to +70, and "Prior Absolute Return" does the absolute value of average return in the period from t=-10 to t=-3. All the coefficients have been multiplied by a factor of 100, and t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
